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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of trade patterns and market size in 
a short time period, in order to identify indicators of the objectives for Chinese foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into the Caribbean region. Key questions assessed are: What 
makes the Caribbean particularly advantageous for Chinese investors and how does the 
host country benefit? Is a higher level of trade, or wealthier markets, associated with 
higher Chinese FDI? Is China pursuing some foreign policy objectives with FDI in the 
region? I hypothesize that Chinese FDI is associated with trade, natural resources, or 
certain foreign policy objectives in the Caribbean region. My results found that Chinese 
imports and Chinese exports are positively correlated, and those Caribbean countries that 
rely upon imports from China are more likely to receive more FDI, where FDI takes the 
form of investments in infrastructure, agricultural and natural materials. Overall, 
Caribbean nations use FDI to stimulate and develop their local economies and 
infrastructure, but at the expense of the exploitation of their raw materials and natural 
resources, or by entering into binding foreign policy commitments and contracts that are 
not necessarily politically or economically beneficial to them in the long run. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past decade, China has become an increasingly integral source of aid and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) for Latin America and the Caribbean. Rising levels of 
FDI and trade over time reflect deepening relationships between China and the 
Caribbean. China continues to strengthen its ties throughout the Caribbean, as imports, 
exports, and FDI flows have grown steadily since the early 2000s (ECLAC; 2011).  
Figure 1: China’s Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in 
2005	  
 
Source: Deutsche Bank  
 
As Figure 1 shows, Latin America and the Caribbean received the second largest 
amount of FDI next to Asia in 2005. This is reflective of the continuous commitment 
China provides both regions. Although these two regions receive higher amounts of FDI 
in comparison to other regions, there are various factors that contribute to the attractive 
nature of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.  China displays interests in a variety 
of sectors across the Caribbean. As Chinese firms continue to diversify their FDI across 
sectors in the Caribbean, they have increasingly shown interest in natural resources, 
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infrastructure, and raw materials. Bauxite in Jamaica, timber and minerals in Guyana, and 
gas and asphalt in Trinidad are a few examples of industries that attract Chinese firms.  
Within the last two years China and Jamaica have signed agreements valued at 
more than US$500 million for road, housing, and other projects, including the 
construction of a Chinese Garden at the Hope Botanic Gardens (Gleaner 2010). 
Subsequently, in 2011, Chinese national oil company CNPC also began a $6 billion 
dollar expansion of Cuba’s oil refinery (Bernal 2010; Reuters 2011). Gregory Chin, from 
York University, points out that, “It is not that China cannot get these commodities 
elsewhere, but the additional resources that the Caribbean supplies gives the Chinese 
government comfort, as well as the ability to negotiate prices”(Chin 2010). Due to 
China’s consistent growth across various sectors in the Caribbean, it is clear natural 
resources, raw materials, and infrastructure contributes to China’s attraction to the 
Caribbean. As Figure 2 displays, the mining sector received a large portion of China’s 
outward direct investment (ODI) in 2010.  Chinese investment in the Caribbean appears 
to reflect a concern for gaining access to minerals as well.  
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  Figure 2: China’s ODI Stock by Sector in 2010
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
   Source: China’s Ministry of Commerce  
	  
 
As China continues to indicate interest in this region, it brings forth important 
questions concerning the long-term policy implications these new economic relationships 
will have. The Caribbean’s economic ties with states in Asia are of concern to 
neighboring countries such as the U.S.  Influential shifts throughout the region may leave 
traditionally dominant partners questioning their place. The Caribbean island of 
Dominica is a living example of the way that China has strengthened its influence by 
moving into countries that the U.S. have neglected. In 2004, Dominica recognized the 
PRC signing onto China’s one policy. In return Chinese firms established infrastructural 
projects worth $100 U.S. millions. China was able to use the 2008 U.S. economic 
recession as an opportunity to increase aid in the region, when the U.S. was not able too. 
This allowed China to be both a primary driver and beneficiary across the Caribbean. If 
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China continues to build their influence throughout the Caribbean region, it raises 
concerns for competition to the United States (Van Dijk 2009; Gallagher 2010).  
Another concern for the U.S. is the possibility of Chinese FDI functioning as a 
substitute for trade (Van Dijk 2009; Gallagher 2010; Porzecanski; 2010).  If Chinese FDI 
is used as a substitute for U.S. trade with the Caribbean, these effects may be detrimental 
to stabilizing the U.S. domestic economy. A restriction in bilateral trade will alter the 
competiveness of any nation state in the global market. In order for the U.S. to stay 
competitive they must partake in trade, if the U.S. can no longer remain competitive trade 
partners they may lose market share.  
Some political and business leaders throughout the Caribbean are already 
concerned about their domestic industries. They are fearful that U.S. export markets will 
be overwhelmed by cheap Chinese imports. As China continues to grow its presence 
throughout the region there are many positive implications for the Caribbean, such as the 
opportunity to develop domestic markets. However, the challenges discussed in relation 
to trade imbalance, the idea of a new core—periphery model, U.S. geopolitical 
influences, and concerns over the Caribbean’s domestic production illustrates the 
significance is assessing Chinese FDI into the Caribbean.  
Chinese FDI also has implications for theories of international relations. Although 
many scholars suggest that Chinese FDI in the Caribbean reflects nerorealism (that is, 
that the Chinese state directs FDI in order to maximize trade, natural resources, or to limit 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan); a theory developed by Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel 
Wallerstein offers an alternate perspective on China’s long-term agenda.  As discussed in 
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the theoretical section, this theory suggests that there is a world economic system, in 
which some countries benefit while others are exploited. Developed and developing 
world into three subcategories, of which are the core, the semi-periphery, and the 
periphery. Core countries dominate and exploit the peripheral countries for labor and raw 
materials, and they are generally not dependent on any one state or country.  They serve 
their own economic interest and are focused on a higher skill and capital-intensive 
production.  In contrast, peripheral countries are dependent on core countries for capital, 
usually lack a strong central government, export raw materials, and have low-skill 
associated with cheap labor. If this model proves true, China’s FDI may contribute to a 
new core-periphery relationship between Caribbean states and the core, which will create 
great challenges for Caribbean countries in attaining economic dependence.1  
Chinese FDI into the Caribbean has not been widely analyzed, due to the recent 
nature of this phenomenon. Thus, my research aims to improve the prior research by 
focusing on the determinants of Chinese FDI in this region.  In order to identify 
indicators of the objectives of Chinese FDI in the Caribbean region, I examined the 
influence of trade patterns and market size over a short time period.   There are three 
major research questions for this study.  First, what economic factors does China evaluate 
in a country to determine if it should invest in that economy? For example, is a higher 
level of trade, or wealthier markets, associated with higher Chinese FDI?  Second, what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Indeed, many countries within the Caribbean are questioning what growing Chinese 
economic relationships will have on domestic control of the economy. What began as a 
focus on economic aid has progressively diversified into FDI in other sectors such as 
tourism, oil, gas, and mining.  However, unlike regions such as Latin America and 
Africa, the Caribbean is a more limited producer of raw materials and food (Bernal 2011; 
CARICOM 2011).   
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sectors are Chinese firms investing in? And what makes the Caribbean particularly 
advantageous for Chinese investors and how does the host country benefit?  Third, is 
China pursuing some foreign policy objectives with FDI in the region? 
I hypothesize that Chinese FDI is associated with trade, natural resources, or 
certain foreign policy objectives in the Caribbean region. My independent variables are 
trade and GDP per capita, whilst FDI was my dependent variable. In measuring these 
economic factors, I investigated potential driving factors influencing Chinese FDI into 
the region.  
I used a data set that covers six countries across the Caribbean: Barbados, Cuba, 
Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These six 
countries have the highest GDP/capita in the region in the periods of 2008-2013. The 
study begins with a literature review, covering the existing literature on FDI and trade 
theories in the region. After this, I present and analyze the data, explaining the methods 
used to formulate my findings. I then discuss the statistical outcomes. Lastly, I conclude 
with the broad implications of my conclusions on the Caribbean, China, and neighboring 
regions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chinese FDI Policy and “Going Global” 
In order to understand the trends in Chinese FDI, it is important to begin with a 
discussion of recent changes in the Chinese state’s policies on outward investment. 
Recent flows of outward Chinese FDI have been influenced by Chinese government’s 
policy of encouraging its companies to expand overseas. FDI began to expand 
exponentially to developing regions beginning in 2001. China’s economic and political 
policies shifted immensely upon joining the World Trade Organization (Li 2010; Zhang 
2003; Wong and Chan 2003; Wu and Chan 2003; Wu and Chen 2001; Ye 1992; Ding 
2000). This act, established the platform for China’s global expansion, however, radical 
FDI policy shifts began in 1979 with the integration of state guidance in FDI.  
Chinese FDI policies most recognizably began in 1979 with the implementation 
of China’s ‘open door policy.’  FDI was now permitted for State-owned companies under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (now the Ministry of Commerce). 
Regulated by the Chinese government, Chinese outward FDI facilitated China’s initial 
integration into the world economy. China’s ‘open door policy’ also marked the 
internalization of Chinese firms under strict control by national and provincial 
government. Government control was most prevalent through direct administrative fiat, 
or economic policies (Buckley 2007; Clegg 2007; Cross 2007; Liu 2007; Voss 2007; 
Zheng 2007). Initial investment projects were minimal, the state allowed approximately 
US$197 million in projects abroad. The following decade consisted of gradual 
diversification and an increase in project allowances to approximately U.S. $1.2 billion. It 
was not until 1992 that China’s FDI policy shifted drastically under the guidance of Ding 
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Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Speech and his determination to create a socialist market 
economy. This era was outlined by three key characteristics—rapidly increasing the rate 
of FDI, expanding investments to include resource development, agricultural, industrial 
production, and other service industries, and a domestic shift in policy objectives 
demonstrated by the state to increase profits and influence on world politics and 
economics (Li 2010; Yu et. Al 2005; Zhang 2003; Wong 2003; Chan 2003; Wu 2001; 
Chen 2001; Ding 2000).   
If Ding Xiaoping’s policies initiated post-revolutionary Chinese engagement with 
the world economy, the final push to globalize came through vigorous state 
implementation of the ‘going global’ initiative.  Implemented in 2000, ‘Going global’ 
was a policy designed to promote continuous increases in overseas FDI. Large state 
enterprises and highly institutionalized private enterprises began to lead overseas 
projects. This change in policy reflected a shift from selective FDI projects to reduce 
governance over economic development. Administrative controls became relaxed, 
approval processes expedited, and a formerly scarce budget for foreign exchange budgets 
increased (Sauvant 2005). China’s economic determination to expand took effect 
immediately. State guidance and the role of policy in Chinese FDI, have been discussed 
across various fields, and are still prevalent today.  
 
The Growth of Chinese FDI in Latin American and the Caribbean: An Overview  
Since the early 2000s, Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
acquired notable attention from the global economy. Several indicators point to a 
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strengthening of China’s role as an investor country. By 2004, China was the eighth most 
important FDI source among the developing world and other advanced middle income 
economies (Buckley 2007; Clegg 2007; Cross 2007; Liu 2007; Voss 2007;  Zheng 2007).  
The data in Figure 3 demonstrate the increase in outward FDI flows to developing areas 
over the last decade. These statistics reveal China’s commitment to strengthening FDI to 
the developing world, including investment in countries located in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Deng 2007;and Van Dijk 2009).  
  Figure 3: Foreign Direct Investment from the PRC (People’s Republic of China)  
 
  Source: CEIC Data Company; 2013  
 
According to the annual statistics from the Ministry of Commerce (as cited in 
Panadeiros  2010), at the end of 2006 Latin America had received 26.6% of FDI stock 
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and was China’s second largest recipient of FDI between 2003-2013.. Thus, in order to 
assess factors that attract China to the Caribbean, it is essential to look at what China has 
already accomplished in neighboring developing regions such as Latin America. There 
are numerous cases of overlapping interest in sectors, policy approaches, forms of FDI, 
and geopolitical influences throughout the region.   
One of the main contentions concerning China’s FDI is that investment flows are 
associated with certain economic and policy objectives. This perspective dictates the kind 
of investment strategies pursued by Chinese companies in their commitment to 
establishing trade relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean.  Indeed, China’s 
approach to trade and FDI in Latin America has consisted of mainly three principles. 
These principles include remaining an exporter of manufactured goods to countries in the 
region, functioning as a buyer of raw materials principally from South American 
countries, and becoming a strong competitor in the export market (Gallagher; 2010).   
Although China’s trade patterns with the Caribbean and Latin America are different, a 
comparative analysis of trade flows among China, Latin America, and the Caribbean also 
show various similarities.  
China is an important source of imports for all economies in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. However, in Latin America, China also provides for an important export 
market. Approximately 23 percent of Chilean, 15 percent of Peruvian, and 13 percent of 
Brazilian exports go to China. China primarily exports manufactured goods to the region 
(53% of which are medium or high tech). The region exports raw materials to China and 
its trade pattern is made up of a few products.   Additionally, the items China imports 
from South America are very selective and reflective of its domestic demands.  For 
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example, Soybean seeds represent 46 percent of Argentine exports to China, copper is 42 
percent of Chilean and 34 percent of Peruvian exports, and oil is 89 percent of Ecuador’s 
exports (ECLAC 2008). The problem with China’s exclusive export selections are that 
Central America is not an important trading partner.  Therefore, large portions of Central 
America are threatened by the exports of almost every country in the sub region.2  
 The main reason behind China’s global FDI expansion, particularly in Latin 
America, is the attempt to acquire and secure natural resources. With China’s growing 
population and consumption, there are simply not enough resources locally to service the 
country. This places immense pressure on state-owned and private firms to secure raw 
materials from markets outside of China.  As the need for natural resources 
predominantly drives Chinese FDI, there are several methods China takes specifically in 
Latin America that creates security. For the most part, Chinese companies have invested 
in Latin America to reduce their exposure to raw material price rises. This business 
rationale was combined with pressure from the Government of China to secure sufficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  An additional problem with Chinese trade is the impact of Chinese imports in 
certain markets.   This problem is illustrated clearly in the case of Mexico. Mexico 
competes with China in many of its exports, 85 percent, of which are under threat. This 
stems from China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 
(Gallagher 2010, Porzecanski 2010). A consequence of this has been Mexico’s slowed 
exports to the U.S. Although the Mexican automobile industry has been able to secure an 
export market to the U.S, garment and textile producers in Mexico have been displaced 
by Chinese imports and have seen immense setback (see Tuman 2014). The trade 
problem Mexico faces has worsened overtime. “In 2009 the import/export ratio with 
China was 15:1, creating a trade deficit of over U.S. 30 billion- and a trade problem of 
growing political dimensions (Lall; 2005, Weiss; 2005).  This disparity in exports and 
competition received from China also has affected their local social and political 
communities. Due to a large number of Chinese imports, local producers and business in 
Mexico have left workers unemployed and out of business. Although this is one of the 
challenges trade can have on FDI relationships, there appears to be consistent factors that 
drive Chinese FDI into Latin American and the Caribbean” (Gallagher 2010).  
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supplies of energy and raw materials.  Additionally, consumption in China has doubled in 
the past decade, compared with an increase of only 11% in the rest of the world. This has 
stimulated growth for companies that are in the raw material industry. Accordingly, over 
90% of confirmed investments by Chinese companies in Latin America have gone to 
natural resource extraction (ECLAC 2011).   Rising prices in raw materials have 
prompted many governments to adopt strategies that insure sufficient supplies of the 
resources. China has taken diplomatic and trade measures to obtain their own supplies 
and resources. This is inclusive of FDI, donations to exporting countries, and purchasing 
contracts that are long-term. In 2009, the bank lent U.S $10 billion to the Brazilian 
company Petrobras, in exchange for 200,000 barrels of oil a day.  It also lent the 
government of Bolivia US $10 billion in 2010, where the repayment plan is distributed in 
oil exports. These contracts allow China to create security in the material they need to 
meet their high consumption levels.                       
In light of China’s growing demand, there is a large incentive for Chinese 
companies to explore investments in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry resources. As 
discussed below, this is also a potential motivator for Chinese companies to invest in the 
Caribbean. Indicators of a strong demand from China for natural resources and 
agriculture together in Latin American and the Caribbean will create potential FDI for 
sectors in crops, livestock, and forestry.   However, Caribbean countries will need to take 
caution as consequences of foreign rights to agricultural sectors come at the expense of 
the livelihoods of locals in rural areas.   
Another potential driver of Chinese FDI is the objective of gaining access to local 
markets. Companies contracted to build public works and industrial infrastructure have 
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developed their capacities in the Chinese market, and are looking to expand 
internationally. Some manufacturing companies chose FDI as a mean of serving specific 
markets, instead of exporting. This allows the company to provide a service in an 
international market, supplying a demand, whilst providing the company the ability to 
outsource labor.3 
 Most countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean believe that 
infrastructure is vital for its development and would like to see more FDI into 
construction.  This poses as an incentive for host countries, looking to attract Chinese 
FDI.  Infrastructure is undoubtedly the sector that has received the most Chinese 
investment in Latin America and the Caribbean after mining and hydrocarbon. Figure 4 
displays future projections of sectors for investment, of which infrastructure is predicted 
to maintain a large percentage of FDI.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  China has also been known to diversify in order serve a global market. These are 
companies that simply cannot function in China, due to inaccessibility, a lack of demand, 
and unavailable resources such as minerals and raw materials. The last factor that has 
been seen to drive Chinese FDI in Latin America has been efficiency-seeking investment. 
As production costs go up, more companies are choosing to move production outside to 
reduce overall costs. The Chinese government openly supports diversification and the 
acquisition of natural resources and key assets, while market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking strategies are supported to a lesser degree or not explicitly.  
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Figure 4: Future Investments by sector in Latin America from 2001-2006
 
	  	   
  Source: CEPAL/ECLAC (2002)                                                                     
 
Throughout Latin America many companies have developed their capacities 
thanks to large sums of FDI placed into infrastructure. For example, investments in 
railways have increased tremendously since 2005, reaching U.S $124 billion in 2010. 
China’s methods of investing in infrastructure in Latin America are typically completed 
through one of three routes. These routes include acquiring existing assets, infrastructure-
building under binational agreements, and channeling investment through public tenders. 
Through utilizing these strategies to pursue infrastructure investment both countries are 
able to benefit, suggesting notions of a symbiotic relationship. 
Infrastructure investment in the Caribbean is largely characterized by 
infrastructure-building that occurs through bilateral agreements. Infrastructure-building 
under binational agreements typically begin with the Chinese government offering 
financing in the form of a loan to the partner government, under the condition that work 
is carried out by the Chinese company. This has happened numerous times across the 
Caribbean in recent years. For example, in the Bahamas U.S. $59 million investment has 
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been provided to build a motorway and the National Stadium saw an investment of U.S. 
$40 million. Additionally, a national stadium is also being built in Costa Rica with a net 
worth of U.S. $100 million. In Barbados, several projects are under way. These include 
construction of St. John Polyclicin, Sherbourne Conference Centre and Empire Theatre, 
and renovation of Cheapside Market (Tax News 2011. ECLAC 2011). In January 2011, 
Antigua and Barbuda received a soft loan from China for U.S. $45 million to build a new 
airport carried out by Chinese companies, which normally import both the materials and 
components and the labor. These methods are increasingly important to the Caribbean. 
However, because Chinese companies in this sector import labor from China it can have 
a negative impact on the local economy since it fails to generate new jobs or develop 
capacity among local providers (MOFCOM 2010).  
Another potential incentive that allows host countries to benefit from investments 
is manufacturing for the domestic market.  Chinese FDI into manufacturing receives a 
large percentage of China’s overall FDI, as exhibited in Figure 5.  Although the data in 
Figure 4 suggest that Chinese FDI in manufacturing is only a small percentage (4.3%), 
one can see examples of the importance of manufacturing FDI in some countries.  
Chinese firms have exhibited this largely in Brazil. In almost every case, products are 
made exclusively for the domestic market, and are not exported to other countries in the 
region (Deng; 2004). This again, creates a mutualistic relationship between the host and 
the lender.  The host is able to use domestic products created, while the lender gains the 
ability to outsource labor, and receive materials as a form of repayment for resource rich 
countries.  
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Figure 5: Chinese FDI Flow into Manufacturing Industry  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
Source: World Bank Organization  
 
 To summarize, Chinese FDI behavior throughout Latin America provides some 
clues about the sources of Chinese FDI behavior in the Caribbean. As discussed, there are 
various sections that overlap in FDI acquisition, benefits on both the host and lending 
end, possible indicators of why Latin America and the Caribbean may be attractive areas, 
types of FDI and investing strategies China has regularly employed throughout Latin 
America, and the relationship between trade and FDI in both regions. Although there are 
many similarities, the Caribbean is still extremely distinct from Latin America in relation 
to geographical proximity, historical relationships, economic stability, development, and 
markets. Thus, it is critical to look at what China has done specifically in the Caribbean.  
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Trends in Chinese FDI in the Caribbean 
 Having discussed the general trends in Chinese FDI across Latin America, I now 
turn to a more focused discussion of FDI in the Caribbean.  China has established itself as 
a significant economic partner throughout the Caribbean region. Importation of Chinese 
goods and services has grown steadily in the Caribbean. Since 2000, Chinese state banks 
have established themselves as the leading lenders in the region. By 2010, China has 
extended about $35 million in credit to the Caribbean, primarily through grants and loans 
for large-scale public works projects (Bernal 2011).  As Chinese finance and FDI 
continues to expand into the Caribbean, many political scientists and economists question 
what factors drive Chinese investment explicitly into the Caribbean region. 
As seen in Table 1, the Dominican Republic received $0.60US million in Chinese 
FDI in the year 2008. However, the country did not receive any inflows in 2007. 
Barbados went from $2.42US millions in 2007 to $3.25US millions in 2008. Jamaica’s 
receipt of FDI spiked from $0.02 US millions in 2007 to $2.16 US millions in 2008. 
Cuba experienced an increase from $66.49US million in 2007 to 72.05 US millions in 
2008. St. Vincent and the Grenadines rose from $20.80US millions in 2007 to $32.49US 
millions in 2008 (Bernal 2010; Chinese Statistical Bulletin of Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment 2011).  
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Table 1: Chinese FDI Stock by Country in the Caribbean 2003-2011 U.S. Millions 
Country  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Antigua and Barbuda 
(PRC) 
 0.20 0.20 0.40 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 4.84 
Bahamas (PRC)  44.45 80.10 14.69 17.52 56.51 0.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 
Barbados (PRC)   1.87 1.65 2.01 2.42 3.25 6.00 3.88 3.13 
Belize (PRC)     0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08   
Cuba (PRC)  13.95 14.85 33.59 59.91 66.49 72.05 85.32 68.98 146.37 
Dominica (PRC)     0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 4.15 8.15 
Dominican Republic 
(ROC) 
      0.60 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Grenada (PRC post 
2005) 
    4.03 7.53 7.65 7.65 14.25 14.54 
Guyana (PRC)  14.04 12.86 5.60 8.60 68.60 69.50 149.61 183.71 135.13 
Jamaica (PRC)     0.02 0.02 2.16 2.16 4.37 39.07 
St. Vincent/ The 
Grenadines (ROC) 
 5.60 5.60 12.27 14.92 20.80 32.49 23.03 36.19 36.20 
Suriname (PRC)  10.06 10.25 13.02 32.21 65.28 67.70 68.80 78.84 78.84 
Trinidad and Tobago 
(PRC) 
    0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.90 
Total   88.30 125.73 81.22 141.99 290.42 258.83 347.12 398.14 468.89 
Source: Chinese Statistical Bulletin of Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2011. 
Compiled by Author. 
 
Objective of Chinese FDI in the Caribbean 
Previous literature has discussed Chinese FDI’s emphasis on resources. Natural 
resources and sector targeting are large attractors to Chinese FDI to the region, 
specifically throughout the Caribbean. Resource-seeking FDI is particularly different in 
this region because unlike Latin America, the Caribbean does not have an abundance of 
oil and gas.  Chinese investment in 2003 was predominantly focused on resource 
exploitation, processing and manufacturing, and service trades. Resource-seeking FDI is 
driven by the need to acquire raw materials and energy sources that are scarce 
domestically.  As previously mentioned Latin America provides raw materials to China 
through exports. In contrast, the Caribbean imports a substantial amount of manufactured 
products for domestic consumption from China. In return for products they offer rich 
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resources in agriculture, infrastructure projects, tourism, and mining. Together these 
resources assist to make the Caribbean an attractive region to invest in.  
The importance of natural resources is illustrated in the case of Jamaica. Sugar 
cane is a very important sector. “Following a privatization in Jamaica, the Chinese trader 
Compant Sugar bought assets worth US $92 million. The operation includes the lease of 
30,000 hectares of land for 50 years to cultivate sugar cane, improvements in sugar cane 
fields, and mills for US $126 million during the first phase and a possible expansion to 
include a refinery and an ethanol plant for US $221 million (Financial Times 2011).   
Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana have taken the lead in presenting 
themselves as strategic areas of interest to China, among the CARICOM countries. 
Trinidad offers gas and asphalt, bauxite in Jamaica, and timber, bauxite, and minerals in 
Guyana. Economic sector distribution for FDI in 2003 reflected 23% resource 
exploration, 42% service trade and commercial service, 25% processing and 
manufacturing, and only 8% allocated across various other sectors (China Commerce 
Yearbook 2004).  In 2004 China increased their initiatives to diversify, which expanded 
their percentage of FDI into resources. Industry distribution mainly flowed 52.8% into 
mining, 26.5% in commercial services, 13.5% in manufacturing, and 3% to retail (Li 
2010; Xilin 2004; China Commerce Yearbook 2005). China’s Ministry of Commerce 
reported that foreign direct investment in the Caribbean totaled nearly $7US billion in 
2009, a more than 300% increase from the 2004 foreign direct investment of $1.7US 
billion. By 2010 China has extended more than $35US million in credit to the Caribbean. 
China’s FDI in the Caribbean region totaled almost $500US million by the end of 2010.  
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According to resource-seeking FDI theory, China will continue to search for resources, 
and raw materials in areas that are developing in order to minimize operation costs.  
Another reason China may find the Caribbean an attractive region for investment 
is due to their ability to outsource labor. As China’s population continues to expand there 
is a greater demand for food and energy. In 2004, China agreed to undertake 
infrastructural development projects totaling over US$100 million in Dominica. These 
projects entail a sports stadium, a grammar school, major road developments, and 
rehabilitation of the Islands major medical facility (Sanders 2011). Chinese immigration 
to Latin American and Caribbean countries is not a new phenomenon. However, over the 
past five years there has been an influx of thousands of Chinese immigrants across the 
Caribbean employed to work on local projects.  
Increased Chinese migration has been widely demonstrated in Suriname. 
Suriname, formerly known as Dutch Guiana, has a growing Chinese demographic. Data 
from China’s embassy estimates that 10 percent of Suriname’s population is Chinese. 
This calculates to approximately 40,000 people in a population of about 500,000. Chinese 
laborers from China Dalian International, which is upgrading Suriname’s roads, reside in 
camps along the forest. Suriname’s growing Chinese community supports two daily 
newspapers and a new television station with 15 employees that broadcast each day in 
Mandarin. Although Suriname is the most discussed case of Chinese immigration, other 
Caribbean countries are seeing a larger Chinese presence also. Countries such as Jamaica, 
Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, are all seeing Chinese business owners opening 
convenience stores and restaurants across the Caribbean. China’s ability to outsource 
labor in large numbers may be a reason for continuous interest in the Caribbean.  
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As Chinese FDI continues to rise, there has been a notable effect on trade. Trade 
volumes have increased at an annual average rate of 32.7 percent from the years 2008-
2013 (Wu 2013). Trade between China and the Caribbean has dramatically expanded. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade between China and the 
Caribbean community specifically CARICOM members have grown exponentially. 
CARICOM’s 15 member regional group grew, which resulted in financial growth by a 
factor of 100 between 1990 and 2008, from a paltry $20 million to over $2 billion 
(Erickson 2009).  China’s top two trading partners in CARICOM are Antigua and 
Barbuda. They are followed by Tobago, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Dominica. Although 
trade is extremely prevalent in these countries, it is also one-sided. In 2008, 93 percent of 
CARICOM-China trade came in the form of Chinese exports to the region. The only 
outlier was Dominica, whom approached a balance exporting over $60 million in goods 
to China in that year. In the last ten years, Chinese exports have consistently made up 
more than 70 percent of total trade (IMF Trade Statistics Directory). This imbalance may 
cause concern for Caribbean countries economies and lead to shifts in domestic policies. 
This is indicative of the severe economic imbalance that Caribbean and Chinese 
economic relationships face.   
As discussed below, China may attempt to use its economic leverage in the 
Caribbean to isolate countries that continue to offer diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. In 
China’s continuous efforts to gain sole diplomatic recognition over Taiwan, state 
guidance in FDI policies can shape foreign economic policy in accordance with this 
agenda. Beijing and Taipei may utilize investment, lending, development aid, technical 
assistance, and academic cooperation strategies in order to acquire diplomatic support 
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throughout the Caribbean region. There have been several accounts of this economic FDI 
behavior since the early 2000s.  
In October 2010, for example, the Bank of China and China’s foreign Trade Bank 
stated they would extend U.S $462 million dollars in financing for an exclusive tourism 
complex in Punta Perla in the eastern part of the Dominican Republic. In February of the 
same year, Taipei had allocated funds in the form of soft loans and grants to their ally-St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. Ambassador to St. Vincent the Grenadines, Camillo 
Gonsalves, met with Taiwanese officials over the construction of the country’s 
international airport and other issues. The airport is scheduled for completion in 2013. To 
further diplomatic initiatives, Prime minster of Guyana (Beijing ally) Samuel Hinds 
received the ‘Medal of China-Latin America Friendship.’ The award was bestowed on 
behalf of a delegation from the Chinese-Peoples Association for Friendship. Additionally, 
recognition was given to Barbados, as a good friend and important partner to China. 
China has also expanded their monetary diplomacy strategies beyond the realm of trade 
and investments. In October 2011, China pledged military assistance worth U.S $1.1 
million USD to the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF). This initiative is funded by Chinese 
investments.  
In sum, the Caribbean region attracts Chinese FDI due to its size and extensive natural 
resources, agriculture, and raw materials. In the next section, I discuss various other 
theories that assist us in interpreting the implications of Chinese FDI throughout the 
Caribbean. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 There are various theorists in economic foreign economic policy and international 
relations that seek to explain what nation states try to achieve in the external realm, and 
why. One school of thought in international relations theory, which attempts to provide 
the framework for understanding how states seek to maximize their security by making 
strategic choices about foreign economic policy, is that of Neorealism (also referred to as 
Structural Realism). In understanding Neorealism, we can better understand how 
countries interact with each other, and can utilize FDI to gain economic power.  In what 
follows, I discuss the theory of Neorealism and how it might be applied to Chinese FDI 
behavior.  In addition, I discuss World Systems theory as an alternative perspective. 
Neorealism and Chinese FDI 
Realism comes in multiple variants that aim to highlight actions in the 
international system on state behavior. A subcategory of realism that most parallels the 
behavior of the Chinese state in FDI patterns is that of neoclassical realism. Neorealism 
includes some general assumptions about the motivation of individual states, but departs 
from classical realism in suggesting that states make foreign policy independent of 
domestic interests. Neorealism also purports that the international system is characterized 
by anarchy. Anarchy does not imply chaos, but only that there is no world government to 
enforce outcomes in the international system (Goldstein; 2010) 
Neorealists adhere to the argument that the goal of a state’s foreign policy is 
driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its 
relative material power capabilities (Desch 1997; Glaser 1996).  They argue that relative 
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material power establishes the basic parameters of a country’s foreign policy. By defining 
‘power’ in relation to capabilities or resources of which states can influence each other, 
and ‘interests’ in relation to goals or preferences that guide the country’s external 
behavior. Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume that 
states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and 
shape their external environment. In this way, states may adopt foreign economic policies 
(that involve trade and FDI) to enhance their power capabilities.  Empiricists claim that 
material powers , acquired in the long run, will shape the magnitude and ambition of 
foreign policies: as their relative power rises states will seek more influence abroad, and 
as it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled back accordingly (Waltz 1997). 
Characteristics demonstrated in Chinese FDI behavior lead theorists to believe that China 
alludes to neoclassical realist behavior are in the case of Taiwan, and timing in 
intervention.  
As noted, much of the literature on Chinese FDI discussed the important role of 
the Chinese state in directing outward FDI in order to achieve certain national objectives.  
Currently, company investment projects have to be approved by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which reports to the State Council, or 
the Ministry of Commerce, and by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). Other factors taken into account are the presence of state owned companies, 
whether it involves obtaining natural resources, and whether the destination of the 
investment is an entity with which China does not have diplomatic relations with the 
NDRC. The process to approve FDI projects usually takes no more than 25 working days 
(RBS 2009). The incentive to invest abroad has become so critical to Chinese companies 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean    Stephenson 27 
	  
that the government offers subsidies to firms that invest abroad in certain priority areas 
such as natural resources, manufacturing and infrastructure projects that involve 
exporting Chinese technology. Almost all Chinese companies today are state owned, or 
state influenced. Their shareholders often include public institutions, and retain a link 
with local government as a means of facilitating the company’s operations in it home 
municipalities. This is primarily due to the continued pursuit of national economic 
imperatives with state-owned enterprises being utilized as an instrument of policy. 
Although state owned guidance and policy is important in understanding Chinese FDI, it 
cannot be explained as the sole response to Chinese FDI in the Caribbean.  
Consistent with Neorealism, the state not only takes the lead in FDI decisions, but 
it may also try to use FDI in the Caribbean to achieve national objectives. For example, 
recent flows of Chinese FDI took off at a time when world flows were plunging owing to 
the financial crisis in 2008. China’s investment overseas in 2008 exceeded US $50 billion 
for the first time and in 2009 China was the world’s fifth largest investor country. This 
was clearly the case in the Caribbean as the U.S. was facing a national economic 
recession; neighboring regions faced economic instability, allowing China to intervene. 
Reasons why China may strategically invest in times of financial vulnerability may be 
found in the host countries response to help. Host countries in the Caribbean that are 
financially weak may offer stronger incentives at the lender’s benefit, offer flexible 
negotiations, and can work to monopolize a region completely. This behavior aligns with 
that of Neorealism because China assumes the position of responding to the uncertainties 
of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape the external environment.  
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The Chinese state’s emphasis on trade and FDI in the Caribbean may also be 
understood through a Neorealist framework. As noted in the literature review, FDI has 
been used to expand Chinese imports of important raw materials.  This is also evident in 
the Caribbean.  In 2008, for example, Antigua and Barbuda became China’s top trading 
partner in the Caribbean with an average worth of U.S $600 million. Trade standards 
between China and the Caribbean community are outlined through the CARICOM 
agreement. 4  
Finally, China’s battle of monetary diplomacy with Taiwan reflects patterns of 
behavior rooted in Neorealism. China uses its domestic policy to shape their foreign 
economic policy and FDI in order to acquire more material power to spread their 
influence abroad. Neorealist thought defines ‘power’ in relation to capabilities or 
resources of which states can influence each other, and ‘interests’ in relation to goals or 
preferences that guide the country’s external behavior. They are utilizing their power viz. 
economic resources of FDI to influence the Caribbean to attain their domestic goal in 
fulfilling the ‘One China Policy’ across the region. Beijing’s desire to see change in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The CARICOM agreement originally began as the ‘The Caribbean Free Trade 
Association’ (CARIFTA), and was founded by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, 
and Trinidad and Tobago on December 15 1965, with the signing of the Dickenson Bay 
Agreement (the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association). They 
were joined on July 1, 1968 by Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia 
and St Vincent and the Grenadines; and on August 1, 1968 by Montserrat and Jamaica. 
The last country to join in 1971 was Belize. CARIFTA became known as ‘The Caribbean 
Community’ (CARICOM) in 1973, of which CARICOM has been actively in place since 
its formation. CARICOM was intended to encourage balanced development of the region 
by increasing trade through buying and selling more goods among the member states, 
diversifying trade in order to expand goods and services available for trade, and 
liberalizing trade throughout reoccurring tariffs and quotas on goods produced and traded 
within the area.  	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global balance of power will require a network of allies from the Caribbean, in 
converting Taipei allies to Beijing.  
In the past few years China has taken an aggressive approach in attempting to 
dissuade Taipei’s ability to invest into the region. One of the approaches China has taken 
to achieve this is the implementation of a policy that attempts to make diplomatic 
recognition of China verses Taiwan a zero sum game. Thus, Beijing suggests that any 
state that recognizes Taipei does so at the risk of losing economic relations with China. 
Only 23 countries that still recognize Taiwan, and all 11 of them are in the Caribbean and 
Latin America region. Due to the high number of countries that still recognize Taiwan the 
Caribbean is a competitive arena in which both Beijing and Taipei have strong interests.5  
 
World Systems Theory 
Another theory that might be useful to understand Chinese FDI is that of 
Immanuel Wallenstein’s Core-periphery model (and the associate model of Andre 
Gunder Frank on Latin America). As mentioned in the introduction, core countries 
usually exploit peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. However, core countries 
are usually capitalist and serve the interests of the economically powerful, because they 
are focused on higher skill and capital-intensive production. Core countries tend to be 
powerful, and with this power these countries pay lower prices for raw goods and exploit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Due to the small number of countries in my statistical sample, and the lack of variation, 
I will not be able to examine the influence of diplomatic recognition of Taiwan on FDI.  
However, recent studies of Latin America and Africa have noted that diplomatic 
recognition is negatively associated with FDI flows (Tuman and Shirali 2015).	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cheap labor, which reinforces the inequality seen between the core and periphery (The 
Capitalist World- Economy; 1979; Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment; 
1979).  
Periphery countries fall on the low end of the economic spectrum, and lack a 
strong central government and may be controlled by other states. These are countries that 
predominantly export raw materials to the core countries, or they are dependent on core 
countries for capital and have underdeveloped industries. Periphery countries are often 
characterized by low-skill, labor intensive production. These traits and behaviors 
represent the periphery. 
When this theory is put into practice it presents a deeply rooted dependency from 
the periphery to the core. Periphery states are vulnerable to exploitation because they rely 
on the core for trade, investment, loans, and technology. However, the dependency is 
completely asymmetrical and one-sided. Core countries don’t necessarily need resources 
from the area they are exploiting, but Periphery countries become dependent on the 
receipt of manufactured goods, technology, investment and loans for capital, where they 
are forced to sell raw materials and agricultural products very cheaply in return to the 
Core. 
Scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank have found evidence of emulated Core-
periphery models in Latin America, which may raise concerns for Caribbean countries. 
Latin American economies were predominantly creating cash crops and raw materials. 
FDI was being used to create foreign owned plantations, but did not expand the industry 
or help countries develop. It resulted in global capitalism forcing countries into a state of 
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under-development. Frank’s study focused on Chile and Brazil. Frank’s findings on Chile 
help to characterize what a core-periphery model looks like in application.  
“Chilean history suggests the conquest not only incorporated this country fully 
into the expansion and development of the world mercantile and later industrial 
capitalist system but that it also introduced the monopolistic metropolis-satellite 
structure and development of capitalism into the Chilean domestic economy and 
society itself. This structure then penetrated and permeated all of Chile very 
quickly. Since that time and in trade imperialism, and the present, Chile has 
become increasingly marked by the economic, social, and political structure of 
satellite underdevelopment. This development of underdevelopment countries 
today through the acute polarization of Chile’s domestic economy” (Frank 1979, 
21-22).  
The Chilean example demonstrates the self-perpetuating model of economic 
underdevelopment, and forces Chile to depend on the Core due to its inability to develop 
on its own. As Caribbean countries continue to deepen economic ties with China through 
FDI, government officials should take note of the previous case study of Chile. Periphery 
countries appear to be developing, however the relationship is reinforcing 
underdevelopment due to a dependence on FDI. The receipt of FDI, trade, and soft loans 
used to promote development among Caribbean countries may deter independence in the 
long-run due to institutionalized dependency. If this model proves true to China and the 
Caribbean, this may be detrimental to the economic development of the developing 
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Caribbean region. In accordance with this theory, countries across the Caribbean may 
need to tread cautiously in creating a dependence on China in order to develop.6                 
  Wallenstein’s core-periphery model, in addition to neorealist theory assists to 
address broader concerns for the Caribbean. These are the implications of China’s global 
strategy. China’s ability to outsource labor to the Caribbean may allude to a larger 
strategy that utilizes demographics among a population as a method of foreign policy.  
Neorealist perspectives outline China’s capability to circumnavigate through specific 
economic policies designed to enhance their stance in the global market. While the core-
periphery model alludes to the notion that reinforcing underdevelopment in the Caribbean 
may further institutionalize dependency. As the Chinese population increasingly grows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   Investment and trade linkages have been studied most widely by Harry Broadman, in 
“Africa’s Silk Road.” His study uses Africa, India, and Asia to illuminate how firms 
engage in trade of intermediate goods (or services) through FDI, or through 
subcontracting which has been a key agent in transforming the global economy 
(Broadman 2007). As a result of these phenomena, there has been a rapid growth of intra-
industry trade, also known as network trade.  
 China has moved progressively from production and trade in labor-intensive, low 
value- added products to production and trade in higher stages of the value chain. With 
China’s growing middle class and increasing purchasing power, there is a large demand 
for imported goods. This follows that China is in search of higher value-added goods and 
services. China’s imports as a percentage of GDP are more than 25%, while for the 
United States, EU, and Japan they are only 15%, 14%, and 11% respectively (Broadman 
2007). Through analyzing the ways in which businesses operate in Africa with a focus on 
the linkages between their investment and trade activities, the literature examines where 
opportunities for network trade might exist in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is accomplished 
through assessing the characteristics of select country-level- industry value chains in 
Africa in comparison to international competitor. Broadman’s results suggest that some 
of the concerns raised by World System’s theory are valid, but others are not.  In 
particular, while African countries are at a disadvantage, he finds that some countries 
have been able to improve their standing after receiving higher levels of Chinese FDI. 
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within the Caribbean, it opens the possibility to further reinforce Chinese ideals in the 
form of reproduction. By recreating a demographic that is largely of Chinese-Caribbean 
decent, it would assist to institutionalize Chinese norms and ideas throughout a region 
that is particularly close to the West. China continues to utilize geopolitics to reinforce 
power; however as Wallerstein and neorealist theorists discuss it raises broader 
implications through their global agenda.                                                                                                                                                                 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
The following section details the hypothesis, data and methodology for the 
statistical analysis of Chinese FDI in the Caribbean.  The hypothesis that guides this 
analysis is that Chinese FDI is associated with the trade levels and market size of a 
Caribbean country. I hypothesize that these factors function as determinants for China’s 
decision to directly invest in specific countries across the Caribbean; and characterizes 
the Caribbean as an attractive region for FDI.  
 
Data and Measures 
The dataset was compiled from a number of sources.  First, the data for total 
Chinese FDI stock in country and year were obtained from the Government of China, 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment.   The figures are in current millions of U.S. dollars.  Second, the 
import and export data were obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Data 
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of Trade Statistics (various years). The IMF obtains their data following the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and, the National Summary Data Page (NSDP).  The 
trade data are also in current millions of U.S. dollars.  Finally, as a measure of market 
size, I obtained the data for per capita GDP from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (2013).  
In 2008, the U.S. recession left the Caribbean vulnerable to economic instability. 
The U.S., which has formally been the Caribbean’s largest trading partner, left the 
Caribbean region questioning their economic status and viability. In 2008 China’s 
investments into the Caribbean region exceeded U.S. $50 billion for the first time. This 
began the rapid growth of Chinese FDI into the Caribbean at a time when world flows 
were plunging in the midst of the financial crisis (ECLAC 2010).  Thus, the dataset 
begins in 2008, and ends in 2010 to capture the most recent data available that follows 
IMF standards of certified data. However, there are some gaps in the data due to 
insufficient information from host government countries across the respective years.  
Lastly, this study evaluates the top six nations in the Caribbean with the highest 
per capita GDP across the region for the stated time series of 2008-2010. The six 
countries include: Jamaica, Cuba, Dominica, Barbados, Barb and Antigua, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines.  
Statistical Model  
This study is largely based upon statistical analysis of panel data. Therefore, the 
author conducted multiple regression analysis in order to determine which explanatory 
factors influence China’s FDI.   The model may be described by the following equation: 
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Model 1: Y’(FDI) =b0+b1(GDP per cpita) +b2(Chinese Trades)  +e 
Where FDI= Foreign Direct investment in Caribbean  
GDP/Capita= Gross Domestic Product per capita in each country and year  
Chinese Trade= the sum of Chinese exports and imports from Caribbean countries in 
each year  
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FINDINGS 
Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Analysis  
Variables Chinese Imports Chinese Exports FDI Stock GDP per 
capita 
Chinese Imports 1.0000    
Chinese Exports 0.5356*** 1.0000   
FDI Stock 0.7960*** 0.4691 1.0000  
GDP per capita 
 
 
-0.4697*** 
 
0.0861 
 
-0.4519*** 
 
 
1.0000 
Note: ***p<.05 for two tailed test.  
I begin with a discussion of the Pearson correlation matrix.  As the findings in 
Table 2 illustrate, Chinese imports and Chinese exports are positively correlated at the 
0.05 significance level, which is an anticipated finding.  Because of this high association, 
I used a combined trade variable (the sum of exports and imports) to avoid collinearity of 
the variables, a potential problem in multivariate regression.  The results also reveal that 
there is a strong positive correlation between FDI stock and Trade imports. This means 
countries that are poorer according to their reliance upon imported goods are more likely 
to require FDI to jump start their economy. Also, we observe a strong negative 
correlation between Chinese imports and GDP, which is consistent with the previous 
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finding and our hypothesis that poor countries as evidenced by low GDP demonstrate a 
reliance upon imported goods.  Similarly, the strong negative correlation between GDP 
and FDI stock indicates that poorer countries as evidenced by a low GDP may be 
implementing stronger incentive policies to attract Chinese FDI as a means of obtaining 
capital to stimulate the economy.  
Table 3 
Multiple Regression Analysis of the Impact of Trade and GDP on FDI in the 
Caribbean 
Variable Model 
Chinese Trade . 0319*** 
(.0065991) 
 
 
GDP per capita -.	  0028061*** 
(.0002862) 
Adjusted R-Squared .75 
Wald Chi-Squate 1557.07*** 
N 15 
  
Note: The dependent variable is stock of Chinese FDI.  Entries are unstandardized OLS regression 
coefficients (panel corrected standard errors in parentheses).   
***p<.01 (two tailed test)  
 
The regression results are reported in Table 3.  The model explains approximately 
three-fourths of the variation in Chinese FDI among this sample of Caribbean countries 
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(adjusted R2 is 0.75).  The results also indicate that both independent variables are 
statistically significant. The coefficient for Chinese trade is positive and significant at the 
.01 level.7  These findings are consistent with our hypothesis in that those Caribbean 
countries that rely upon imports from China are more likely to receive more FDI, with 
this FDI taking the form of investments in infrastructure, agricultural and natural 
materials.  Likewise, the coefficient for GDP per capita is negative and significant. This 
finding suggests that countries with lower GDP per capita are more likely to attract or 
need FDI.  Because the regression model specified holds trade constant, we cannot 
determine whether the Caribbean’s reliance upon trade with China ultimately has a 
negative impact on GDP that increases the need for FDI.  Unfortunately, we are limited 
by our data and model specification.  However, a cyclical paradox of dependency would 
not be surprising, if later research is able to pinpoint this relationship.   
Although I was unable to estimate the effects of imports and exports separately in 
the regression model (due to collinearity), it should be recalled that the Pearson’s 
correlation analysis supports the hypothesis because exports do not have a strong 
statistical relationship with FDI.  China does not have an export-oriented market in the 
Caribbean which accounts for the large disparity between imports and exports in the 
region. The states in the Caribbean region are heavily reliant upon Chinese imports—
almost exclusively. Consequently, there is not a large export market. Thus, exports would 
not affect FDI because in order for states to receive FDI they would largely be import 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  A separate model with the log transformation of trade produced results that are 
completely consistent with Table 3.  This suggests that the results are not distorted due to 
large different in trade among these countries (probably due to the similar economic size 
of most Caribbean economies).	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based economies, and have a low GDP. Therefore, even the findings that do not achieve 
statistical significance in the model lend credence to the hypothesis.  
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CONCLUSION 
 This study sought to understand how Chinese FDI is allocated among countries in 
the Caribbean.  By compiling a dataset and conducting a statistical analysis of total trade 
and GDP in relationship with FDI, the study has produced results that suggest that some 
Chinese national interests (trade) are important.  As discussed, the results for trade in the 
regression model, along with the examples discussed in the review of the literature, are 
consistent with a Neorealist view of the role of the Chinese state in FDI decisions.  In 
addition, by showing that a country’s GDP is inversely affected by FDI, this study has 
clarified the economic indicators China looks for to invest in the Caribbean. As noted in 
the literature and supported by this study, China seeks to build import based markets, 
with low GDP countries becoming dependent upon FDI, in various forms – which is 
consistent with Neorealism.  The outcome is that Caribbean nations use FDI to stimulate 
and develop their local economies and infrastructure, but at the expense of the 
exploitation of their raw materials and natural resources, or by entering into binding 
foreign policy commitments and contracts that are not necessarily politically or 
economically beneficial to them in the long run (as suggested by World Systems theory).  
This study has many implications for Caribbean countries.  First, this research 
identifies potential factors that China explicitly looks for when making the decision to 
invest in Caribbean nations. However, it also discusses the possible negative affects FDI 
based economies can have and are having in the Caribbean and Latin America. For 
example, the large disparity between imports and exports, a new core-periphery model of 
dependence that will ultimately hinder any form of permanent individual development, 
and the social implications of natural resources and agriculture to the local economy. By 
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looking at trade and FDI in relation to natural resources and foreign policy it is clear that 
Chinese FDI is influenced by these factors, and that they play a large role in the decision-
making process of how Chinese FDI is distributed among regions.  
The main weakness I found in the study was a lack of data. Unfortunately, the 
data are not available to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between 
trade, GDP and FDI.  Many developing countries simply lack any form of officially 
reported data and with that it is difficult to track down which sectors China is investing 
in, as well as the per capita GDP and total FDI stock for the Caribbean countries. This 
study was completed with data that is officially available, however due to large gaps in 
the data sets there is still not enough information to offer a comprehensive study. 
Additionally, because the phenomenon is relatively new there are still many gaps in the 
literature. Further studies are needed in order to fully address Chinese FDI in the 
Caribbean.  
Although there are limitations, this study contributes to the existing literature by 
identifying some of the factors that China looks for in Caribbean nations when making 
the decision to invest. Therefore, the study findings have relevant implications because it 
highlights political, social, and economic concerns of the Caribbean region. I believe that 
Chinese FDI can be beneficial to a nation’s economy because it allows many 
underdeveloped countries the opportunity to make advancements; however, there are also 
negative implications that have resulted in economic dependency and the exploitation of 
raw materials and natural resources. With that in mind, this study advocates for the 
implementation of strategic local level policies that address these risks, while also taking 
advantage of the symbiotic benefits of FDI.  
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